What a real introducer agreement looks like — and what to avoid.

The word introducer covers a narrow and specific activity: making an introduction between a prospective client and a service provider, and nothing more. A properly drafted introducer agreement should say, in plain terms, that the introducer's role ends at the point of introduction — they identify a prospect, pass on contact details or make an initial connection, and the service provider takes it from there. Everything downstream of that point, the fact-find, the advice, the structuring, the arranging of the deal, the handling of client funds, belongs to the regulated entity, not the introducer.

In practice, the line blurs constantly, and it blurs in ways that create real regulatory exposure for both sides. An introducer who starts explaining product features to a prospect, comparing options, or suggesting which structure would suit the client's circumstances has moved from introduction into advice, and advice on regulated products or services is itself a regulated activity in most jurisdictions we work across. The same applies to arranging: an introducer who negotiates fee terms on behalf of the client, collects documents as part of a formal onboarding process, or takes any role in executing a transaction is arranging deals, which typically requires its own licence or authorisation.

This matters because the label in the contract does not control the legal characterisation of the activity. Regulators and courts look at what was actually done, not what the parties called it. We have seen introducer arrangements unwind badly — commissions clawed back, regulatory referrals made, and in a handful of cases enforcement action against the principal firm — precisely because an introducer agreement described a narrow role on paper while the introducer's actual conduct, evidenced in emails and call records, looked indistinguishable from advice.

A well-drafted agreement addresses this directly rather than leaving it implied. It should include an explicit statement of the introducer's permitted activities, an equally explicit list of activities the introducer is not authorised to undertake, and a requirement that the introducer refer any question that strays into advice, product comparison, or deal terms straight back to the regulated principal. This is not boilerplate; it is the clause that determines whether the arrangement can survive regulatory scrutiny if the relationship is ever examined.

For founders and brokers building a referral network, the practical takeaway is to design the commercial relationship around the narrow definition first, and only then draft the paperwork to match it — not the reverse. An agreement that describes a compliant introducer relationship on paper while the parties intend a broader commercial role from day one is a liability waiting to surface, usually at the worst possible moment, such as during a regulator's file review or a dispute over an unpaid fee.

Scope defines what the introducer is being engaged to introduce — a specific product line, a specific client segment, a specific service — and it should be drafted narrowly and specifically rather than left open-ended. A scope clause that simply says the introducer will refer 'potential clients' with no further definition invites disputes later about whether a given referral actually falls within the arrangement, particularly where the introducer works across multiple principals with overlapping offerings.

Exclusivity is where we see the most one-sided drafting in practice. Some agreements presented to introducers demand exclusivity — a commitment not to refer business to any competing provider — without offering anything meaningful in return: no minimum volume of introductions, no guaranteed pipeline, no defined exit if the exclusivity is not commercially justified by the flow of business. An introducer who signs an unlimited, indefinite exclusivity clause has effectively handed a competitor a veto over their business relationships with no corresponding protection.

A reasonable exclusivity clause, where exclusivity is commercially justified at all, should be scoped to a specific territory, a specific product or client category, and a fixed term with a defined review point. It should also specify what happens if the principal firm does not actually generate business through the introducer during that period — a right to terminate the exclusivity, or to renegotiate, rather than the introducer being locked into a one-sided arrangement indefinitely.

Territory definitions deserve particular attention because vague geography creates disputes that are difficult to resolve later. 'Europe' or 'the Middle East' means different things to different parties and can span dozens of jurisdictions with materially different regulatory regimes. A properly drafted agreement lists the specific jurisdictions covered, addresses what happens when a prospect operates across multiple jurisdictions, and states clearly whether the introducer's rights follow the client's registered address, operating base, or some other defined test.

Where multiple introducers might plausibly claim credit for the same prospect — a common scenario in cross-border finance where a client may have been approached by several intermediaries over time — the agreement should set out, in advance, how a competing claim will be resolved: typically on a first-registered basis with a clear, time-stamped process for submitting a prospect's details to the principal, rather than leaving the question to be argued after the fact when the commercial stakes are already high.

Almost every dispute we see between introducers and principal firms traces back to an undefined or loosely defined concept of the 'introduced client.' The agreement needs a precise, mechanical definition: what counts as an introduction (a named referral submitted in writing, a warm handoff on a call, a signed registration form), the point in time the introduction is deemed to have occurred, and what evidence establishes that a given client relationship originated from that specific introducer rather than from the firm's own marketing or another channel.

Equally important is the attribution window — the period during which a fee remains payable on business the introduced client transacts with the principal firm. Without a defined window, disputes arise years later when a client who was introduced once returns for a second, much larger transaction, and the introducer claims a fee the principal firm never intended to pay indefinitely. A typical, defensible structure ties the attribution window to a fixed period from the date of first introduction (commonly twelve to thirty-six months, though this should be negotiated to reflect the actual sales cycle of the business in question), with a separate, usually shorter, tail period covering transactions that were already in active negotiation when the window closed.

The agreement should also address what happens if the introduced client is later introduced to the same principal by someone else — a second introducer, an internal sales effort, or the client approaching the firm directly. A clear, chronological 'first introduction wins' rule, evidenced by a dated log the principal firm maintains, avoids a large share of the disputes we see in practice. Firms that fail to keep this kind of introduction log create their own exposure, because in the absence of records, the introducer's version of events, however implausible, becomes difficult to disprove.

A further point that is frequently missed: the definition of an introduced client should specify whether it extends to related entities and affiliates of the introduced party. A client introduced as an individual founder who later transacts through a newly incorporated holding company, or a corporate client whose subsidiary in another jurisdiction separately approaches the principal, creates exactly the kind of ambiguity that ends up in dispute if the agreement has not addressed it directly.

Finally, both parties should agree, in writing, a practical mechanism for confirming attribution at the point a transaction closes rather than relying on memory or informal correspondence months or years later. A short written confirmation exchanged at the time of each qualifying transaction, referencing the original introduction, is a modest administrative step that prevents a disproportionate amount of later dispute.

Introducer fees are structured in several recognisable ways, each with different risk allocation between the parties. A flat fee, payable on completion of a qualifying transaction, is the simplest and easiest to administer, but it needs a precise trigger event defined — is the fee payable on signing, on funding, on the client's first transaction, or on some other milestone — because 'on completion' means different things across different types of engagement.

Tiered fees, which scale with transaction size or client lifetime value, need clear bands and a clear method for calculating which tier applies, particularly where a client's business with the principal grows over time. Recurring or trailing fees, common where the introduced relationship generates ongoing revenue for the principal (a retained banking relationship, a recurring payment processing arrangement), require the most careful drafting because they run for an extended period and are the fee structure most likely to be disputed or unilaterally reduced years into the relationship.

Success-only fees, payable only if the introduced client actually transacts, shift performance risk onto the introducer, which is a reasonable allocation where the introducer has genuine influence over whether a prospect converts, but is far less reasonable where the principal firm's own onboarding process, pricing, or service quality is what actually determines conversion. An introducer negotiating a success-only structure should push for some visibility into, or at minimum a right to be informed about, why a qualifying introduction did not convert, rather than accepting a bare 'no deal, no fee' outcome with no transparency.

The critical clause that is routinely missing or poorly drafted is when a fee crystallises — the specific event that fixes the principal's obligation to pay, as distinct from when payment is actually due. A fee should crystallise on an objectively verifiable event (contract signature, first funds received, licence granted, account opened) rather than on a subjective assessment by the principal of whether the relationship was 'successful.' Agreements that leave crystallisation to the principal's discretion effectively give the fee-payer a unilateral veto over whether they ever have to pay, which is not a genuine commercial arrangement.

Payment timing, currency, and the treatment of taxes and withholding should also be specified precisely, particularly in cross-border introducer arrangements spanning multiple jurisdictions with different withholding tax regimes. An agreement silent on withholding tax typically results in the introducer receiving less than the headline fee once the principal firm's local tax obligations are applied, which is a common and avoidable source of friction if addressed at drafting stage rather than discovered at the first payment.

A non-circumvention clause prevents the principal firm — or, in a well-drafted mutual clause, the introducer — from going around the other party to deal directly with an introduced contact, bypassing the fee arrangement entirely. This is one of the most commercially important protections in the entire agreement, because the underlying risk it addresses is real and common: a principal firm receives an introduction, builds a direct relationship with the prospect, and then simply stops routing further business through the introducer.

An effective non-circumvention clause needs three elements to actually function: a clear definition of who is protected (the specific named contact, and reasonably foreseeable related parties such as affiliates and successor entities), a defined duration that extends meaningfully beyond the point of first introduction rather than expiring the moment the introducer's immediate involvement ends, and a specific, quantifiable remedy if the clause is breached, typically the fee that would have been payable had the introduction gone through proper channels, rather than a vague entitlement to 'damages' that would require expensive litigation to actually quantify.

Non-circumvention should be read alongside, and cross-referenced with, the confidentiality clause and the attribution window discussed above, because the three provisions together are what actually protects an introducer's commercial position. A non-circumvention clause with no defined duration, or one that expires as soon as the immediate transaction closes, offers almost no real protection against a principal firm that simply waits out the clause before re-engaging the contact directly.

Reciprocity is worth negotiating for, particularly where the introducer is bringing genuinely proprietary relationships to the table. A one-way non-circumvention clause that binds only the introducer, while leaving the principal free to introduce the same contact elsewhere or use the relationship for other purposes, is not a balanced arrangement and should be flagged as a point for negotiation rather than accepted as standard.

Enforcement in practice is harder than the clause itself suggests, particularly across borders, which is precisely why the definitional and evidentiary clauses discussed elsewhere in this guide matter so much. A non-circumvention clause is only as strong as the introducer's ability to prove that circumvention actually occurred, which is another reason to insist on a documented introduction log and periodic written confirmations of client status throughout the life of the relationship rather than relying on the clause alone.

Introducer arrangements necessarily involve the transfer of personal and commercial data about prospective clients — names, contact details, financial information, sometimes sensitive information such as source of wealth or beneficial ownership detail — between the introducer and the principal firm. This transfer is a regulated activity in its own right in most jurisdictions with modern data protection law, and an introducer agreement that does not address it directly is incomplete regardless of how well the commercial terms are drafted.

At minimum, the agreement should specify the legal basis for sharing prospect data (typically the prospect's own consent, obtained by the introducer at the point of introduction, or a legitimate interest basis where permitted), the categories of data that may be shared, the purposes for which each party may use the data, and the security standards each party commits to in handling it. Where the introducer and principal are in different jurisdictions with different data protection regimes, the agreement should address cross-border transfer mechanisms explicitly rather than assuming the issue away.

Consent from the prospect themselves deserves specific attention. An introducer who passes a prospect's contact details and financial information to a principal firm without the prospect's knowledge or consent creates a data protection exposure for both parties, and increasingly a reputational one, given how sensitised clients in financial services have become to unsolicited data sharing. The agreement should require the introducer to obtain, or confirm the prospect has been given clear notice of, the intended data sharing before any information is transferred, and to retain evidence that this was done.

Confidentiality operates alongside data protection but covers a broader category of information: commercial terms, pricing, deal structures, and information about the principal's business that the introducer may become aware of during the relationship. A confidentiality clause should be mutual, should survive termination of the agreement for a defined period (typically two to five years, sometimes indefinitely for genuinely sensitive commercial information), and should carve out information that is already public, independently developed, or required to be disclosed by law or regulator, so the clause is not read as preventing legitimate regulatory cooperation.

A frequently overlooked point is what happens to client data and records when the agreement terminates. The agreement should specify whether the introducer must delete or return prospect data on termination, what happens to data on clients who were successfully introduced and remain active with the principal, and how any ongoing regulatory record-keeping obligations (which can run for many years after a relationship ends) will be satisfied once the introducer relationship itself has ended.

Because introducers sit at the front end of client acquisition, principal firms — particularly regulated banks, payment institutions, and financial services firms — increasingly require introducers to make specific representations and warranties about anti-money-laundering and sanctions compliance as a condition of the agreement, and this is a reasonable and increasingly standard requirement rather than an unusual one.

A properly drafted agreement should include representations that the introducer will not knowingly introduce a prospect who is subject to applicable sanctions, that the introducer itself is not owned or controlled by a sanctioned person, that the introducer will conduct basic reasonableness checks before making an introduction (even where full KYC remains the principal's responsibility), and that the introducer will promptly disclose anything it becomes aware of that would call a prospect's legitimacy into question.

It is important for introducers to understand the boundary here: an introducer representation should never be drafted in a way that shifts the principal firm's own regulatory AML and KYC obligations onto the introducer. The principal, as the regulated entity actually onboarding and transacting with the client, retains primary responsibility for know-your-customer checks, ongoing monitoring, and suspicious activity reporting. An introducer agreement that tries to make the introducer contractually liable for the principal's own compliance failures is both commercially unreasonable and, in many cases, will not actually shift regulatory liability, which sits with the regulated entity regardless of what the contract says.

Where an introducer operates in a jurisdiction with its own AML framework applicable to introducing or referral activity, the agreement should reference the introducer's own compliance obligations under that framework and require evidence of an appropriate policy, however lightweight, particularly where introduction volumes are meaningful. This protects the principal firm as much as it protects the introducer, since regulators increasingly expect firms to conduct a degree of due diligence on their own distribution channels, not just their end clients.

Sanctions screening deserves a specific mention because the consequences of getting it wrong are severe and can attach personally to individuals involved, not just to the entities. Any introducer operating across multiple jurisdictions should understand, and the agreement should make explicit, which sanctions regimes apply to the relationship (which will often include more than one, given extraterritorial reach of certain sanctions programmes), and should require immediate notification if either party becomes aware of a sanctions concern regarding an introduced client at any point in the relationship.

Liability clauses in introducer agreements are frequently drafted in the principal firm's favour, and introducers should read them with particular care because an unbalanced liability clause can expose an individual or a small introducing firm to financial risk entirely disproportionate to the fees they stand to earn. The starting point should be a liability cap, expressed as a defined multiple of fees earned or paid over a defined period, rather than an open-ended or uncapped exposure.

Indemnity clauses require particular scrutiny because they are often drafted broadly enough to make the introducer responsible for losses that are, in substance, the principal firm's own regulatory or operational failures. A reasonable indemnity from the introducer to the principal should be limited to losses arising from the introducer's own breach of the agreement, misrepresentation, fraud, or wilful misconduct — not losses arising from the principal firm's own onboarding decisions, its own compliance failures, or general commercial risk inherent in dealing with the introduced client.

Conversely, introducers should push for a reciprocal indemnity from the principal firm covering losses the introducer suffers as a result of the principal's own breach, regulatory failure, or misrepresentation to the introduced client, particularly where the introducer's own commercial reputation is at stake if the principal firm mishandles a client relationship the introducer facilitated.

Uncapped indemnities are one of the clearest red flags in this entire category of agreement and are addressed further in the red-flags section below, but the underlying principle is simple: no introducer, individual or firm, should accept unlimited financial exposure in exchange for a fee that is fixed, modest, and often contingent on factors entirely outside their control. Where a principal firm insists on an uncapped indemnity as non-negotiable, that insistence is itself informative about how the relationship is likely to be managed if a dispute ever arises.

Insurance is worth addressing directly in the negotiation even where it does not appear in the agreement itself. Introducers operating at any meaningful scale should consider whether professional indemnity or equivalent cover is available and proportionate to the risk being accepted under the agreement, and principal firms should not assume an introducer carries insurance simply because the agreement includes an indemnity clause — the two are entirely separate questions.

The term of an introducer agreement should be clearly stated, whether fixed, rolling, or open-ended, along with a clear notice period for either party to terminate for convenience. A reasonable notice period gives both parties time to wind down the relationship in an orderly way, including completing any introductions already in progress, rather than leaving pending introductions in limbo at the point of termination.

Termination for cause — breach of confidentiality, a sanctions or AML concern, insolvency, or a material breach of the agreement's core terms — should be distinguished clearly from termination for convenience, because the two typically carry different consequences for outstanding fees. An agreement that allows the principal to terminate for convenience and simultaneously extinguish all fees on introductions already made, but not yet converted, is generally unreasonable and should be negotiated, particularly where the introducer has already done the work of making the introduction and the delay in conversion is outside their control.

The most commercially significant question at termination is what happens to fees on business that was introduced before termination but converts afterward. This is precisely what the attribution window discussed earlier is designed to resolve, and the termination clause should cross-reference it explicitly: introductions made and logged before the termination date should remain eligible for fees under the original attribution window terms, regardless of when the underlying transaction actually completes, unless the agreement is terminated for the introducer's own cause.

Certain clauses need to survive termination for the agreement to have any lasting value: confidentiality obligations, data protection commitments, non-circumvention protections for a defined tail period, accrued but unpaid fees, and any indemnity or liability provisions relating to conduct that occurred during the term. The agreement should list these survival provisions explicitly in a dedicated clause rather than leaving survival to be inferred, because an ambiguous or silent agreement is generally interpreted as terminating all obligations on the termination date, which can strip an introducer of protections they assumed would continue.

Finally, agreements should address what happens to fee entitlements if the principal firm is acquired, restructured, or the specific business line the introducer was referring into is sold or wound down. An introducer relationship tied to a particular product or team can otherwise simply evaporate in a corporate reorganisation with no mechanism to preserve accrued or pipeline fee entitlements, which is a foreseeable risk worth addressing explicitly at drafting stage rather than after the fact.

Cross-border introducer relationships routinely involve parties in different jurisdictions, and the choice of governing law and dispute resolution mechanism materially affects how enforceable the agreement actually is in practice, not just in theory. A governing law clause naming a jurisdiction neither party has any real connection to, chosen simply because a template happened to specify it, can leave both sides litigating an unfamiliar legal system if a dispute ever arises.

The practical questions to work through before accepting a governing law clause are: which jurisdiction's courts or arbitral institutions will actually be able to enforce a judgment or award against the other party's assets, whether the chosen jurisdiction has a reasonably efficient and predictable court or arbitration system for commercial disputes of this size, and whether the cost of pursuing a dispute in that jurisdiction is proportionate to the fees genuinely at stake under the agreement.

Arbitration is often preferred over litigation in cross-border introducer agreements because arbitral awards are generally easier to enforce internationally than court judgments, proceedings can be kept confidential (which matters where client relationships and commercial terms would otherwise become part of a public court record), and the process can be faster and more predictable than litigating in an unfamiliar foreign court system. Where arbitration is chosen, the agreement should specify the seat, the administering institution, the number of arbitrators, and the language of proceedings, rather than a bare reference to 'arbitration' with no further detail, which invites its own dispute about procedure before the underlying dispute can even be heard.

A dispute resolution clause should also specify a pre-litigation escalation process — a defined period for good-faith negotiation between named senior individuals at each party before either side can commence formal proceedings. This is a low-cost addition that resolves a meaningful proportion of disputes before they require external adjudication, and its absence from an agreement is a minor but telling signal about how carefully the rest of the document was drafted.

Finally, currency and jurisdiction for payment of any award or settlement should be addressed, particularly where fees are calculated and paid in one currency but a dispute is resolved under the law of a jurisdiction using another. Exchange rate risk and the practicalities of enforcing a monetary award across borders are easy to overlook at drafting stage and expensive to discover only once a dispute is already underway.

The single greatest regulatory risk in introducer relationships is perimeter drift — the gradual, often unintentional expansion of an introducer's role from a narrow, unregulated introduction into activity that requires its own licence or authorisation. This happens incrementally rather than all at once: an introducer starts by simply passing along contact details, then begins fielding basic questions from prospects, then starts explaining how a product works, then starts comparing options across several providers, and at some point along that path has crossed into regulated advice without anyone formally deciding that it should happen.

The specific activities that typically require a licence, and that an introducer agreement should therefore explicitly exclude from the introducer's role, include: giving advice or a recommendation on a specific financial product or service, negotiating the terms of a transaction on behalf of either party, arranging or facilitating the execution of a deal, handling or having any control over client funds, and holding out to the public as authorised to provide the underlying regulated service. Any of these activities performed by an unlicensed introducer creates exposure not just for the introducer but for the principal firm, which may be found to have facilitated unauthorised activity by allowing it to occur within its distribution network.

Perimeter risk is jurisdiction-specific and does not travel neatly across borders — an activity that is comfortably unregulated introduction in one jurisdiction can constitute regulated arranging or advising in another, particularly where financial promotion rules, consumer credit regulation, or investment services rules apply more broadly than in the introducer's home market. An introducer operating across multiple jurisdictions should not assume that a role considered safe at home is equally safe everywhere the principal firm operates, and the agreement should require the introducer to confirm compliance with local regulatory requirements in each jurisdiction where introductions are made.

Marketing materials and how the introducer describes themselves publicly matter as much as what is written in the private agreement between the parties. An introducer whose website, social media, or pitch materials describe themselves as an adviser, consultant, or broker, while the underlying agreement describes a narrow introduction-only role, creates a mismatch that a regulator examining the arrangement will treat as strong evidence the actual activity exceeded the stated scope, regardless of what the contract says on paper.

The practical discipline that keeps an introducer relationship inside the perimeter is a written escalation rule, built into day-to-day practice and not just into the contract: the moment a prospect asks a question that touches on product suitability, comparative advice, or deal terms, the introducer refers the prospect to the principal firm's own qualified team rather than answering directly. Firms that train their introducer networks on this rule, and audit adherence to it periodically, materially reduce both their own regulatory exposure and the exposure of the introducers they work with.

Certain clauses recur often enough in poorly drafted or deliberately one-sided introducer agreements that they are worth flagging as a specific checklist of warning signs, each of which should prompt a negotiation before signature rather than being accepted as standard market practice.

Unlimited or indefinite exclusivity with no defined term, no minimum commitment from the principal firm, and no review point is the first and most common red flag — it locks the introducer out of alternative relationships without any corresponding guarantee of business flow. Closely related is an undefined or overly broad territory clause that leaves genuine ambiguity about where the introducer's rights actually apply, which becomes a source of dispute the moment a cross-border prospect appears.

Uncapped indemnities are the most financially dangerous red flag in this category of agreement: an introducer accepting unlimited liability for losses that may have nothing to do with their own conduct is accepting a risk entirely disproportionate to the fee on offer. Fee claw-back provisions with no time limit are a close second — a clause allowing the principal to reclaim previously paid fees indefinitely, rather than within a clearly bounded period tied to a specific, objectively verifiable event such as a client's fraud being discovered, gives the principal an open-ended right to withhold or reverse payment long after the introducer has reasonably assumed the matter closed.

The absence of data protection terms altogether is a red flag that is easy to overlook because it is a gap rather than a bad clause, but an agreement silent on how prospect data is to be shared, secured, and handled at termination exposes both parties to regulatory risk under applicable data protection law and should be treated as incomplete rather than acceptable as drafted. Similarly, the absence of any AML or sanctions representations in an agreement involving cross-border financial services introductions is a signal that the principal firm has not thought through its own distribution-channel risk, which is itself a reason for caution about the wider relationship.

Other recurring warning signs worth naming specifically: a fee crystallisation event left entirely to the principal's discretion rather than tied to an objective milestone; a governing law and dispute resolution clause naming a jurisdiction with no genuine connection to either party and no practical means of enforcement; a termination clause that extinguishes all pending fee entitlements immediately on termination for convenience; and an agreement that describes a narrow introduction-only role while separately requiring the introducer to perform tasks, such as collecting KYC documents or negotiating pricing, that plainly exceed that role. Any one of these on its own warrants a conversation before signing; two or more together suggest the agreement was not drafted with a genuine, balanced commercial relationship in mind.

Before signing any introducer, referral, or finder's fee agreement, work through a structured review rather than reading the document once and relying on a general impression of fairness — the clauses that cause disputes later are rarely the ones that stand out on a first read. Confirm first that the scope of permitted activity is narrow, specific, and matches what you actually intend to do, and that it explicitly excludes advice, negotiation, arranging, and any handling of client funds unless you hold the relevant licence to perform those activities.

Check that exclusivity, if it exists, is time-bound, territorially specific, and includes a minimum commitment or review mechanism from the principal firm rather than binding you unilaterally. Confirm the definition of an introduced client is precise and mechanical, that an attribution window is stated in months rather than left open-ended, and that the agreement describes a clear, evidenced process for establishing who introduced a given prospect if more than one party might claim credit.

On fees, confirm the trigger for payment, the crystallisation event, the payment timeline, currency, and treatment of withholding tax are all stated explicitly, and that fee claw-back rights, if any, are tied to specific, objectively verifiable events and bounded by a clear time limit rather than open-ended. Confirm the non-circumvention clause has a meaningful duration beyond the immediate transaction and a quantifiable remedy, and check whether it is mutual or one-sided.

Confirm the agreement addresses data protection and consent to share client information explicitly, including the legal basis for data sharing, security obligations, and what happens to data at termination; confirm confidentiality obligations are mutual and survive termination for a defined period; and confirm any AML or sanctions representations are proportionate and do not attempt to shift the principal firm's own regulatory obligations onto you.

Finally, review the liability cap and indemnity provisions for proportionality against the fees actually on offer, confirm the termination and survival clauses protect fees already earned or in the pipeline, and confirm the governing law and dispute resolution clause names a jurisdiction with a genuine, enforceable connection to the relationship. Where any of these points is unclear, unaddressed, or one-sided, raise it in writing before signing — a short round of negotiation before signature is materially cheaper than a dispute after the relationship is already underway. This checklist is general information, not legal or tax advice, and any introducer agreement with meaningful commercial value should be reviewed by qualified counsel in the relevant jurisdictions before signature.