US banking from anywhere you operate, through a US LLC.
If your customers pay in dollars, your platforms settle only to US accounts, or your local banking has narrowed on your sector, a US LLC gives you a legal identity US institutions are built to underwrite. Each guide below is written for one market: what actually breaks locally, which institutions onboard non-residents, the documentation that gets approved, the rails you need and the timelines to plan around.
Europe
Euro, sterling and CEE-currency businesses selling into the United States, plus founders whose local banking has narrowed on their sector.
UK banks and EMIs open quickly and exit quickly. Sector-level de-risking, 'notice of closure' letters with no appeal, and GBP-first pricing on every dollar invoice are the three complaints we hear most.
Irish retail banking is concentrated in a handful of institutions after Ulster Bank and KBC exited, which narrows both appetite and negotiating room for cross-border digital businesses.
German account opening is document-heavy and process-bound: Handelsregister extracts, notarised documents, Schufa checks and branch appointments, with little tolerance for non-standard models or non-resident directors.
French banks apply rigid internal policy to non-resident-controlled entities and unusual activity codes, and while the droit au compte exists, a closure is effectively final for the relationship.
Dutch institutions have de-risked hard after large domestic AML enforcement cases; crypto, gaming, adult and high-volume e-commerce are routinely exited regardless of how clean the individual file is.
Belgian banks are conservative on cross-border flows and slow to open for companies whose customers sit entirely outside the EU, with heavy documentation at onboarding and little flexibility afterwards.
Spanish banking works domestically but is inconsistent branch to branch for non-residents, and USD handling is slow and expensive for a business that bills in dollars.
Portuguese banks tightened sharply on non-resident and digitally-native businesses as the residency-visa wave grew; accounts that opened easily in 2020 are reviewed hard in 2026.
Italian account opening is documentation-heavy and relationship-driven, and USD handling at retail banks is priced badly for a company that bills in dollars.
Austrian institutions run conservative risk policy and decline rather than negotiate when a company's counterparties are mostly outside the EU or its ownership sits abroad.
Polish banking is fast and modern domestically but zloty-first: every dollar invoice loses value at conversion, and recurring USD receipts from foreign platforms attract review.
Czech banks handle domestic business well but treat koruna-based companies with mostly USD revenue and non-resident ownership as exception cases.
Romanian institutions are increasingly cautious with high-volume cross-border flows and freelance-to-corporate structures.
Bulgarian banking is workable but narrow, and USD flows from US platforms often attract source-of-funds review.
Greek banks remain conservative post-crisis, with slow onboarding and limited appetite for digitally-native models.
Swedish banks have de-risked aggressively; many will not open for companies whose revenue is entirely outside the Nordics.
Danish institutions apply strict AML programmes and are slow with entities controlled by non-residents.
Norwegian banking is domestic-first, and NOK-USD conversion on every invoice is a real margin cost.
Finnish banks are efficient but narrow in appetite, and non-standard models are declined rather than negotiated.
e-Residency made incorporation easy but banking hard: many e-resident companies never secure a durable account.
Latvian banking rebuilt itself around strict de-risking, and non-resident business is treated with caution by default.
Lithuania's EMI sector is deep but volatile: accounts open fast and close fast when portfolio policy shifts.
Hungarian banking is HUF-first, and USD receipts from US platforms are converted at unfavourable spreads.
Croatian institutions are still building appetite for digitally-native and cross-border businesses.
Cypriot banking has narrowed considerably; onboarding is slow and correspondent USD access has been reduced.
Maltese banks apply long onboarding cycles and cautious policies to gaming, crypto and other regulated verticals.
Asia & Southeast Asia
Markets where capital controls, currency policy, entity structure or platform coverage — not risk appetite — are what stop a globally-facing business from getting paid.
Thai banks serve domestic business well but treat foreign-owned companies, USD receivables and platform income as exceptions; Bank of Thailand reporting sits behind every inbound transfer.
Vietnam runs a managed currency with genuine capital controls: outbound transfers require documented purpose, and USD holding by a local company is constrained by SBV rules.
Hong Kong company formation is trivial; Hong Kong bank account opening is not. Non-resident directors, thin substance and any China-adjacent flow now face long onboarding and routine de-risking.
Singapore banking is excellent for substantive local business and unforgiving of everything else: non-resident directors, minimal local substance and higher-risk verticals face long onboarding or a polite decline.
Malaysian banking is solid domestically, but foreign-exchange policy notices govern USD holding and outbound flows, and Sdn Bhd companies get limited support from US platforms.
Indonesian banking is deep domestically but IDR-first, and foreign-owned PT PMA structures carry minimum capital requirements and licensing scope that make a light-touch global entity impractical.
Philippine banking is retail-strong and USD-awkward: BSP rules govern foreign-currency accounts, and freelancers and BPO-adjacent operators are routinely paid through remittance rails that cost them margin.